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RESEARCH ARTICLE

CHALLENGES OF ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE IN NIGERIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM ADMINISTRATION

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ABSTRACT

The study examined the challenges of actionable intelligence in Nigeria's counterterrorism administration. Three specific objectives were raised for the study which set to: ascertain the existing counterterrorism intelligence operations structure; its effectiveness in counterterrorism and identify and analyze the key challenges mitigating effective actionable intelligence among the Joint Taskforce (JTF) engaged in counterterrorism in Nigeria's Northeast corridor. The study adopted the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Theory while qualitative exploratory and descriptive analysis within the purview of historical design was deployed to systematically collect and content-analyze the secondary data. Findings indicate that the existing intelligence agencies among the security outfits involved in the counterterrorism operations were not fit for the requisite actionable intelligence needed for counterterrorism operations. It was further revealed that in spite of noticeable intelligence-driven efforts to neutralize scores of terrorist insurgents and rescue of abducted civilians, the actionable intelligence component appears weak, unsustainable and mixed results as critical intelligence is delayed or ignored leading to delayed responses to insurgent attacks. A number of key challenges were identified as mitigating effective actionable intelligence within the counterterrorist Joint Taskforce (JTF) in the Northeast, which include: operational constraints shortage of intelligence officers/sufficient training, poor intelligence gathering and sharing: poor access to human intelligence in the northeast region absence of surveillance and intelligence infrastructure in ungoverned areas, politicization of the intelligence community, inadequate funding and corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, among others. It was therefore recommended among others, the need to strengthen intelligence infrastructure for enhanced inter-agency collaboration, increased capacity for human and community-based intelligence; investment in advanced technological-based intelligence operation, and capacity building and training of intelligence personnel and institutions for effective actionable intelligence operations.

Keywords: Actionable intelligence, counterterrorism, insecurity, inter-agency rivalry, intelligence agencies.

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1.0. INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian state is beset with litany of insecurity since the inception of the present fourth republic. These include crime-related insecurity such as banditry, farmer-herdsmen clashes, cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, ritual killings, and violent secessionists agitations, terrorism, among others as well as identity politics-related violence insecurity such as communal and ethno-religious conflicts. These security threats have severely dealt a huge blow on the country's security architecture causing disruptions on the socio-economic fabrics of the country. However, this study is specifically concerned with the challenges of actionable intelligence in Nigeria's counterterrorism administration which reared up since 2009 till date.

The Boko Haram insurgency which found its footstool in northeastern Nigeria is about the greatest threat that has led to mass casualties, displacement, and economic devastation. Boko Haram has been a 'home-grown' terrorist group which almost made the Northern Nigeria ungovernable during Jonathan's and Buhari's administrations through its deadly bomb/gun attacks on police stations, army barracks, correctional centres, churches, mosques, public institutions, etc. (Counter Extremism Project, 2025). Responding to the Boko Haram's threat, the Nigerian government has struggled to assemble a counterterrorism outfit using the existing security apparatus, which of course, could not be effectively executed without an effective intelligence outfit, which is actionable.

For the fact that the Boko Haram terrorism and its splinter group known as the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP), have persisted till date in spite of the heavy kinetic counterterrorist operations, is evident that there is something wrong with Nigeria's intelligence component of the security administration which could have been positioned to effectively anticipate the insurgent actions and neutralize its dangers. Whereas intelligence plays a vital role in providing understanding of the intentions, capabilities, and operations of various threat actors, actionable intelligence on the flipside refers to processed intelligence that can be immediately deployed for use or acted upon (Kivan & Bigelow, 2024).

The capacity to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate accurate intelligence is very vital; however, the ability to quickly or speedily utilize such intelligence is even more crucial in counterterrorism operations, and that approximates actionable intelligence. This study is very critical in that it is one thing to assemble and process intelligence, and another thing to make effective and timely use of it to mitigate or nip the insurgent attacks on the bud. The above suggests that there are harvests of intelligence among the various security outfits in the country, yet they lack actionable intelligence, which has immensely impeded the counterterrorism intelligence coordination in the country.

Mounting surveillance and intelligence gathering remain effective means by which law enforcement agencies adopt in tackling security problems. By so doing, they collect and process sufficient intelligence information to accomplish array of security tasks such as prevention of crime not yet committed, intervention in crime being committed and investigation of crime that has already been committed (Ashaolu, 2013). However, the overbearing kinetic approach adopted in counterterrorism operation in Nigeria, which places emphasis on deployment of physical force while relegating effective deployment of intelligence and prompt response to the so collected intelligence reports has instead emboldened the insurgents to increase their striking capability and unleashing insecurity in the Northeast **(**Nwagboso and Nwagboso, 2021**).**

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As the government and its security agencies have continued to stress mainly on high handed military operations in their campaigns against the Boko Haram insurgents, it has inadvertently not been able to increase intelligence community collection on when and how the former plot and harsh their planned attacks (Asanebi, Theo-Iruo, Odoh, 2021; Owoniyi, 2021). This has led to near breakdown of security architecture and consequent spate of lethal attacks on the Joint Task Force (JTF) thereby challenging the very institutions of the state charged with counterterrorism in the country. The indispensability of actionable intelligence in counterterrorism cannot be overemphasized.

The former United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton harped on this in her speech on Global Counterterrorism Forum held in Istanbul, Turkey some years back. According her, terrorism (and associated organized violent crimes) should be handled beyond just military operation but much more with intelligence, which involves nipping their finances, recruitments and safe havens on the bud (U.S. Department of State, 2012). This implies that once the insurgents' capability is weakened, they will find it extremely difficult to operate.

The unresolved issue of actionable intelligence which goes beyond mere intelligence gathering seems not to have been given adequate and appropriate attention by policy makers and security institutions alike, giving rise to undue reliance on use of kinetic energy in counterterrorism over and above intelligence mechanism in apprehending perpetrators in the Northeastern corridor (Nwagboso and Nwagboso, 2021). This is irrespective of the fact that there are number of intelligence units in virtually all the security agencies involved in JTF on counterterrorism operation in the Northeast. Experts are of the opinion that the persistent weak actionable intelligence in Nigeria's counterterrorism operation has inadvertently crippled its ability to nip the terrorists in the bud. It is therefore assumed that the insurgent lethal attacks would have been averted or drastically minimized had it been that there is a virile and robust actionable intelligence network and greater administrative collaboration in place of unhealthy rivalry among and between the intelligence agencies and other security cum law enforcement agencies within the JTF operational commands in the Northeast

The extent to which the instrument of intelligence has been welded to fight the terrorist insurgents in Nigeria portends significant deficiencies hindering the effectiveness of different facets of joint military operations by various administrations since the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. This has in itself vitiated the security agencies' capacity to effectively contain the tide of ferocious attacks on not only civilians, but also on the very military bases in the various theatre commands of the counterterrorism in the Northeast. While substantial research had focused on traditional intelligence gathering and kinetic counterterrorism operation (Onuoha, 2019) there are substantial gaps in studies addressing the role of non-traditional approach such as actionable intelligence in neutralizing terrorism (Sule et al., 2021).

This lack of comprehensive research on emerging intelligence prerequisites and limited intelligence capability to effectively respond to the evolving security threats necessitated this research. Much of the literature lay emphasis on intelligence-gathering techniques but pay less attention to how intelligence is effectively processed and utilized by policymakers and security agencies (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016), particularly JTF on counterterrorism. This yawning gap emasculates the understanding of the actual contribution of intelligence to administration of counter-terrorism in the Northeastern operational theatre. Besides, the integration of local knowledge and community

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engagement which are major variables that can enhance the effectiveness of actionable intelligence is often neglected (Adelani, 2023). Failing to incorporate these local insights further hampers the ability of intelligence operations to effectively address the security threats posed by the terrorists at the grassroots level. The need for incorporating best practices that improve Nigeria's actionable intelligence frameworks should be sufficiently explored rather than overlooked (Onuoha, 2023).

The gaps indicate an urgent need for exploring stronger and more effectively coordinated actionable intelligence frameworks to ensure that intelligence operations are conducted within acceptable levels to neutralize the terrorists' enclaves. The above requisite effort is couched on the perception that in spite of the huge investments on security agencies engaged in counterterrorism and intelligence infrastructure, Nigeria continues to grapple with terrorism and associated violent crimes (Nwonwu, 2025). The perennial threat of insurgency has caused significant casualties, economic instability and widespread insecurity characterized by massive displacement of people in terms of generating internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees' turnover from northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, creating humanitarian crisis, such as lack of food, shelter, healthcare, and education.

The above situation has led to an increased militarization of the region with manifold consequences such as diverting huge government spending on counterterrorism operations in place of other developmental concerns; human rights abuses in terms of arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings by security forces. On the flipside, besides making Northeastern region unsafe, terrorist activities have exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, particularly between Muslims and Christians with reports of terror groups targeting specific ethnic and religious groups (Owoeye &Zubairu, 2024). There is therefore, a growing need for credible study that transcends both intelligence gathering and utilization in Nigeria's counterterrorism administration with the aim of identifying gaps in the current intelligence system and propose practical measures that could foster effective and proactive use of intelligence to mitigate terrorists' threats on national security.

1.1. Aim of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the challenges of actionable intelligence in Nigeria's counterterrorism administration. To achieve the above aim, the study's specific objectives are:

i. To ascertain the existing counterterrorism intelligence operations structure.
ii. To assess the effectiveness of intelligence-gathering mechanisms employed in counter-terrorism in Nigeria's Northeast corridor.
iii. To identify and analyze the key challenges mitigating effective actionable intelligence among the Joint Taskforce (JTF) engaged in counterterrorism in the Northeast.

2.0. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Conceptual Clarifications

Actionable Intelligence

The term actionable intelligence refers to processed security information which is of immediate use or that can be acted upon, in response to an emergent security threat (Gulen, 2025). Shephard Media (2021), Pearson and Watson (2010) added that it means "having the necessary information

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immediately available in order to deal with the situation at hand," specifically; it denotes "intelligence that can be acted upon within a 12 to 72 hour period of time." On the whole, it refers to useful intelligence that can be quickly acted upon. Another dimension to actionable intelligence refers to actionable threat intelligence which denotes a distilled, contextual and real-time data about threats and threat actors that empower security teams in identifying, prioritizing and mitigating security risks (Chang, 2025). Corroborating the above definition, Shephard Media (2021) described actionable intelligence as 'the delivery of the right information at the right time in the right context'. Ultimately, the fulcrum of actionable intelligence revolves around mutual understanding of situation, dispatched with speed, accuracy and timely that is necessary to conduct highly successful security operations.

O'Brien (2013) defined actionable intelligence in its broader form as being in possession of the available necessary information in the immediate for dealing with the security situation at hand. On the whole, actionable intelligence is tantamount to necessary intelligence information that enables security operatives to deal promptly and efficiently with a particular security situation. Thus, when security intelligence assumes relevance in protecting the society from both external and internal threats in an effective manner it becomes an actionable intelligence, because the end point of such intelligence is to act promptly in protecting the society from crime infestation. This is corroborated by Cornell Law School (2022) which stressed that the essence of gathering intelligence report is not only to identify criminal elements, but to anticipate, prevent and monitor criminal activity.

Thus, actionable intelligence in counterterrorism efforts as a crucial component in national security encompasses the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information essential for preempting terrorist activities and safeguarding civilian populations (Military Dispatches Editorial, 2024). Actionable intelligence in counterterrorism enables surveillance data and system alerts to respond proactively to potential threats (Gulen, 2025) of the terrorists. It aids the military to gather crucial data for strategic planning and operational readiness. It then implies that intelligence operation cannot be complete until its prompt utility to preempt terrorist activities which by implication safeguards the lives and property of the people. Actionable intelligence is such that adapts and re-strategizes as threats evolve to ensure the deployment of effective military counterterrorism measures (Military Dispatches Editorial, 2024).

Emphasizing further, Sharper (2022) distinguished between actionable intelligence and mere intelligence gathering. Thus, while intelligence assists the commander to visualize the operational base of the adversary, actionable intelligence on the contrary provides commanders and soldiers with a "high level situational understanding in a timely manner with accuracy and relevance towards achieving operational success against the adversary or criminal elements. Therefore, actionable intelligence offers security agencies of all cadres the "most timely and accurate intelligence information which they deploy in taking actionable decisions. In fact, actionable intelligence (A.I) is the operational aspect of security agencies' intelligence system (Association of the United States Army, 2005) with which to thwart enemy or insurgent plans and save lives (Pearson and Watson, 2010).

From the foregoing, in spite of the intricate relationship between regular intelligence and actionable intelligence, it is evident that actionable intelligence differs a great deal from regular intelligence, because while the former may provide details of a specific situation or circumstance, such as information that is good or useful to know, but not necessarily needed for immediate action on one

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hand; actionable intelligence is needed by military commander or operational officer to make quick decisions about a situation such as a critical situation (Gulen, 2025) in counterterrorism operational theatre in the Northeastern Nigeria. On the contrary, lack of actionable intelligence becomes an intelligence or recommendations that has been delayed, ignored or compromised (Adewumi, 2011). Thus, for actionable intelligence to be operational there has to be a "sustained scenario of preemptive and simulative exercises to stay a step ahead in maintaining security" (Adewumi, 2011). The next section discussing its importance will throw more light on the indispensable nature of actionable intelligence in repudiation of insecurity.

In a nutshell, actionable intelligence is important in the following ways:

- It enables the security operatives to preempt attacks by criminal elements and insurgents alike, by attacking first before the latter could strike.
- It helps the security operatives to predict criminal/insurgent intentions and when and how best to attack them.
- It helps the law enforcement agencies to attack with precision without necessarily causing collateral damage (Learn ArCGIS, 2021).
- Without actionable intelligence, irrespective of the quantum of weapons deployed, the security system is prone to be overwhelmed by the bandits and other criminal elements (Ayitogo, 2022).

Intelligence in counterterrorism efforts derives from various sources, which include: Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence gathering through personal interactions with informants possessing insider knowledge of the terrorists and surveillance. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): This comprises the interception and analysis of communications and electronic signals to preempt potential attacks. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): This is concerned with the use of satellite imagery and geographic data to track movements associated with terrorist activities. Open-source Intelligence (OSINT): OSINT gather intelligence from available information in the public domain, which includes social media, news articles, and blogs, providing an accessible pool of data for analysts to scrutinize emerging threats (Military Dispatch Editorial, 2024).

Terrorism: There are various interpretations of terrorism but for this study, we chose to adopt the commonly acceptable meaning which denotes: any use of terror in the form of violence or threat means to coerce an individual, group or entity in a manner in which the person or group in question could not otherwise lawfully force them to act (Hoffman, 2022). Corroborating the above, the act of terrorism also refers to the use of violence or threats of violence to intimidate or coerce societies, governments, or individuals in pursuit of political, ideological, or religious goals. The act of terrorism may vary depending on the group or individual, but is commonly perpetrated to achieve political or ideological objectives, inflict harm, or fear on target populations in order to gain attention. Terrorists employ such methods as, bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, intimidation etc., to gain the requisite attention or discredit a government (Owoeye & Zubairu, 2024).

Categories of Terrorism in Northeastern Nigeria

There are two main categories of terrorism in Northeastern Nigeria. These are: religious and transnational terrorism. Each of the categories are presented in what follow.

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Religious Terrorism (Boko Haram): This is the first and foremost terrorist group in the Northeast Boko Haram primarily engaged in religious terrorism. This group's main focus is extremist interpretation of Islam, and opposes Western education and governance. It aims at establishing an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has carried out bombings, abductions, and attacks on government and military targets. The much celebrated kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014 earned the group international attention. The sect was initially non-violent until 2009 when its leader, Mohammed Yusuf and several other members were alleged to have been killed extra-judicially by the security agencies. The group then turned violent, clashing with security operatives, targeting its bombing spree on government institutions, schools, and innocent civilians (Owoeye & Zubairu, 2024).

Transnational Terrorism (ISWAP): The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a splinter group from Boko Haram and turned a transnational terrorist group operating primarily in the northeastern Nigeria. ISWAP aligns itself with the Islamic State (ISIS) and conducts sophisticated terrorist activities, including suicide bombings, attacks on military and government facilities, and the establishment of territorial control. ISWAP operates not only in Nigeria but also across the borders of neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, having the goal of creating an Islamic caliphate in the region. The group's ideology and mode of operation across national borders aligns with the global Islamic State (ISIS) which is recognized globally for its complex, organized attacks and territorial control (Owoeye & Zubairu, 2024).

Counterterrorism: Counterterrorism denotes the practices, strategies, and tactics used by governments, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of terrorism (Wilkerson, 2002). The essential goals of counterterrorism are to protect citizens and infrastructures from terrorist attacks, disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the spread of extremist ideologies. The methods employed in counterterrorism ranges from intelligence gathering, surveillance, law enforcement operations, military interventions, and diplomatic efforts. In the case of Nigerian counterterrorism operation, these include both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches deployed to decimate terrorists, but the Nigerian scenario has proven that of all counterterrorist measures, the actionable intelligence component is the most essential which provides the compass for guided and precision-based actions, without which the operations remain uncoordinated and misdirected.

Administration: Administration involves the effective use of human, material and financial resources for the achievement of organizational goal(s) (Mintrom, 2016; Titus et al., 2024). Here, it denotes effective use of military, intelligence, weaponry and financial resources to achieve actionable intelligence-driven counterterrorism in Northeast Nigeria.

2.2. Theoretical Framework: Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Theory

The study is anchored on the Counter-insurgency (COIN) theory referred to as comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to defeat insurgencies and stabilize a nation-state. The theory is widely credited to Lieutenant Colonel David Galula, an influential French officer and author whose publications focused is on population. Between1956 and 1958, Galula served in Algeria's

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mountainous Kabylia region as a company commander with 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion. He later published two books in English that summed up his experience in Algeria. The two books containing counterinsurgency strategies were republished with prominent forewords in 2006: *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, originally published in 1964 was introduced by John Nagi, one of the United States Army's most-respected thinkers on counterinsurgency. Subsequently, the other book, *Pacification in Algeria* was presented by Bruce Hoffman, then a leading terrorism expert at RAND Corporation. Galula also became one of the most quoted sources in General David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency field manual as well as the wider debate on the subject (Rid, 2010).

Counterinsurgency theory recognizes the fact that insurgency is an asymmetry war which is different from conventional war, hence requires entirely different approach. The proponents of the theory conceive the idea that counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate power. On the other hand, insurgents lack power, but have the advantage regarding intangible assets such as ideology and a general lack of responsibility. While counterinsurgents actors are powerful, they are obliged to uphold law and order, which limits their potential action. On the other hand, insurgents lack power, but they are much freer to violate both their promises and social norms. Insurgents also decide when and where the conflict will begin, since they become insurgents through their own contentious actions. Indeed, counterinsurgency exists only in reaction to an insurgency. The asymmetric nature of this relationship requires the successful counterinsurgency to capitalize on its tangible advantages and limit the insurgent's ability to benefit from its intangible advantages (Galula, 1964 cited in Beyond Intractability, 2025).

Unlike conventional warfare, COIN focuses on winning the "hearts and minds" of local populations while simultaneously disrupting insurgent operations through military, political, economic, and informational strategies (Galula, 1964). Central principles of COIN include protecting civilians, building legitimacy for the host government, and gathering and utilizing intelligence to neutralize insurgents (Kilcullen, 2010). The following are expressed as the laws of COIN often referred to four laws of counterinsurgency by Galula:

1. The first law is that the population is paramount. That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign. Without the support of the population, it is impossible to root out all the insurgents and stop further recruitment.

2. Such support is most readily obtained from an active minority. Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority.

3. Having attained the support of the population it is imperative to remember that this support is conditional. What you do matters, and support can be lost if your actions are unfavourable to the population.

4. Lastly, counterinsurgency regards the "intensity of effort and vastness of means." Given that counterinsurgency requires a large concentration of effort, resources, and personnel, it is not likely to be pursued effectively everywhere at once. Rather, action should be taken in select areas while resources are moved as needed. Thus, the laws of counterinsurgency emphasize the importance of making continuous efforts to gain and maintain the support of the populace in distinct areas by leveraging an active minority (Beyond Intractability, 2025).

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Thus, the aim of COIN is not only to eliminate insurgent forces but also to address its root causes that fuel their support, such as political marginalization, economic instability, and grievances against the government. Within COIN operations, intelligence coordination is a critical component that influences the success of military and civilian efforts. Effective intelligence coordination ensures the timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of information across various agencies, enabling them to act swiftly against insurgent activities. Galula (1964) emphasized that insurgents thrive in environments where the state lacks timely and accurate intelligence. In his model, intelligence serves as the foundation for understanding the insurgent network, its leadership, and its operations. Intelligence helps to map the insurgency, revealing its tactics, support base, and vulnerabilities. One of the most influential models of intelligence in COIN is David Galula's four-stage theory, which highlights the importance of continuous intelligence gathering and its role in isolating insurgents from the population.

Galula stressed that the population is the center of gravity in COIN, and intelligence derived from the local populace is crucial to understanding insurgent movements. Timely and accurate intelligence enables counter-insurgents to anticipate insurgent actions and adapt their operations accordingly (Galula, 1964). Similarly, Kilcullen (2010) reinforced the need for intelligence networks that connect the military with local communities to gain actionable intelligence. These networks must operate within a feedback loop, where intelligence is constantly updated and used to adjust COIN strategies in real-time.

Application of the Theory to Northeast Counterinsurgency Theatre

This theory is highly applicable in counter insurgency environments, where it is expected that intelligence flows between different actors must be efficient and unimpeded. Any delays or distortions in the communication chain can lead to intelligence failures and operational setbacks. Karl Weick's Sense Making theory provides additional insights by highlighting the role of shared understanding in crisis situations (Weick, 1995). In COIN operations, various agencies must constantly make sense of evolving insurgent tactics and rapidly changing environments. Intelligence coordination, in this sense, serves as a process of collaborative sense-making, where agencies jointly interpret information, adapt strategies, and respond to insurgent threats. The theory of Counterinsurgency is useful to this study in the sense that the major setback in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations is the issue of gathering intelligence and timely use of the intelligence so obtained.

The flow of intelligence between military, police and other security agencies is often hampered by poor communication infrastructure and bureaucratic inefficiencies (Smith, 2020). Shannon and Weaver's model suggests that the effectiveness of intelligence coordination depends on minimizing "noise" in the communication process, which can arise from inter-agency rivalry, lack of trust, or technological constraints. Weick’s theory of sense-making applies when agencies in Nigeria fail to align their interpretations of insurgent activities, leading to fragmented and delayed responses. The ongoing insurgency requires security agencies to constantly adapt their understanding of Boko Haram and ISWAP’s evolving strategies, which underscores the importance of seamless information-sharing mechanisms.

Interagency collaboration emphasizes the need for different organizations to work together towards common goals, especially in complex operations like COIN (O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). Effective

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collaboration requires shared objectives, clear communication channels, and trust between organizations. However, in practice, interagency coordination is often hampered by institutional silos, differing organizational cultures, and competition for resources or recognition (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). The theory of network governance, which promotes the idea of decentralized decision-making, highlights the importance of integrated communication networks in overcoming traditional hierarchies and institutional barriers (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Networked organizations, particularly in COIN, can enhance collaboration by promoting flexibility, responsiveness, and real time information-sharing, enabling security forces to respond more rapidly to insurgent threats. In Nigeria, interagency collaboration is often undermined by institutional mistrust, rivalry, and poor coordination between the military, police, and intelligence agencies (Okeke, 2020).

The theoretical framework of interagency collaboration suggests that overcoming these barriers requires reforms to break down silos and establish formalized processes for information-sharing and joint operations. The Nigerian security apparatus operates within a highly bureaucratic structure, leading to inertia and inefficiency in intelligence coordination. According to Christensen and Lægreid (2007), overcoming these challenges requires not only institutional reforms but also a cultural shift towards greater trust and collaboration among agencies. The Nigerian counter-insurgency operations would benefit from the application of network governance principles, where a more decentralized and integrated communication network could improve the speed and effectiveness of intelligence sharing. This approach would allow for faster adaptation to the insurgents' constantly evolving tactics and reduce delays in executing counter operations (Smith, 2020).

3.0 MATERIALS AND METHOD

Qualitative exploratory and descriptive analysis was deployed to systematically collect, classify and critically review various strands of data that were sourced from journal articles, working papers, official documents of the government cum intelligence and security agencies, newspaper reports, workshop and conference papers, internet websites and published text books. Following the stated specific objectives, the data so collected were content-analyzed and interpreted thematically to draw plausible and verifiable results and conclusion on the state of actionable intelligence in the country, factors responsible for the typology as it relates to the counterinsurgency administration in Northeastern Nigeria operational theatre commands. The study adopted qualitative method of research within the purview of Historical-descriptive design.

4.0. DISCOURSES

4.1. Evaluation of the Counterterrorism Intelligence Structure in Northeast

Existing Counterterrorism Intelligence Operations Structure in the Northeast Nigeria, like other countries across the globe has established relevant outfits saddled with the task of providing intelligence within the national security architecture. These intelligence setups began with the Nigeria Police Force. The Nigerian police created two principal intelligence units: the Force Criminal Investigations Department (FCID) and the Federal Investigations and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB).

a. **FCID**: The FCID conducts investigations and prosecutes complex crimes within and outside the nation. The FIIB carries out intelligence gathering and surveillance to aid other police units.

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

b. **SSS (DSS):** The SSS (later designated Department of State Service (DSS), formed in 1986, operates under the presidency and answers directly to the National Security Adviser (NSA). It manages domestic intelligence and ensures the national security of the country is not compromised. The SSS (DSS) is also empowered to eliminate 'national threats' and provide security for top government officials and visiting dignitaries. Nasiu and Olusegun (2022) underscored the fact that the Department of State Services (DSS) is one of the most prominent intelligence agencies in Nigeria given its pivotal role of ensuring internal security and intelligence gathering. Operating under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the DSS is tasked with the responsibility of protecting the country from threats such as terrorism, espionage, and political instability.

c. **Joint Intelligence Board (JIB)**: The JIB was established by the Federal Military Government in 1986 to supervise the overall intelligence operations towards the fulfillment of General Babangida's resolve to restructure Nigeria's security apparatus. The JIB was founded under the National Security Adviser's office, and the Board receives intelligence that has been gathered and analyzed by the other intelligence organizations. Part of JIB's responsibilities is to compile the data so collected and submit same to Nigeria's highest security body, the National Security Council. As the nation's Chief Security Officer, the President chairs the National Security Council. This keeps him acquainted with the information obtained and which enables him discharge his responsibility of making the final decision or judgment (Bot, 2023).

d. **The National Intelligence Agency (NIA):** Under the NSA, the NIA is charged with gathering international intelligence. Established in 1986, it is responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. It collates external intelligence aimed at protecting Nigeria's security interests outside its shores (Omoniyi, 2021). With a focus on foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the NIA gathers information about intentions and capabilities of foreign governments and nonstate actors that may pose threats to Nigeria's national security (Awotayo, Omitola, Omitola and Oderinde, 2023), and it works closely with other intelligence agencies to coordinate efforts and share information (Kilani, 2024).

e. **Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA):** The DIA was established in 1986 to provide an efficient system of obtaining military intelligence for the Armed Forces (Omoniyi, 2021). The DIA focuses on military intelligence, in contrast to the NIA and DSS, which are more concerned with domestic civilian intelligence than with foreign ties between Nigeria and other nations.

f. **Defence Military Intelligence (DMI):** This is the intelligence outfit of the military services. The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) is charged with the functions of collection and processing of information, i. e. collation, evaluation, interpretation, which are thereafter converted into intelligence, dissemination of intelligence in a suitable form in order to service the end point users and training of intelligence and observation of members of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (Bot, 2023).

g. **National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA):** In recent years, significant efforts have been made to improve interagency cooperation and collaboration in Nigeria leading to the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and

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FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). These have provided platforms for high-level coordination and policy formulation across security agencies.

h. **Joint Task Force on Counterterrorism (JTF-CT):** The Joint Task Force on Counterterrorism (JTF CT), comprising personnel from the DSS, NPF, Nigerian Armed Forces, and other security agencies is an interagency working group established to address specific security challenges, such as counterterrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime. As an interagency collaboration, the JTF-CT has played a critical role in disrupting terrorist activities, apprehending suspects, and securing vulnerable areas, particularly in the northeastern region plagued by the Boko Haram insurgency (Gill & Webb, 2023).

International partnerships and cooperation have also contributed to strengthening interagency relationships in Nigeria. Collaboration with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, such as the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United Kingdom's MI6, has contributed in facilitating information sharing, capacity building, and joint operations targeting transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations. Interagency collaboration is seen as the bedrock of Nigeria's national security architecture, playing a critical role in effective governance, law enforcement, and counterterrorism endeavours (Gill & Webb, 2023).

Interestingly, Nigeria is not lacking in intelligence agencies. Judging from the number of agencies enumerated above, there is every cause for intelligence outfits to cover the length and breadth of the country and as well be able to deal with the security threats posed by Boko Haram insurgency even before they carry out their onslaughts; yet, it appears they are not able to stop these activities before they happen. These begs for answers to the questions; what then are the duties and responsibilities of the intelligence and security agencies? What are the duties of these agencies vis-à-vis terrorism in Nigeria and how effective are they in addressing the age-long Boko Haram insurgency?

When the Boko Haram insurgency escalated in 2009, the Nigerian government mounted several military operations aimed at dismantling the group and restoring security. The Nigerian military, alongside the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which includes troops from Chad, Niger, and Cameroon launched major offensives, including Operation Flush in 2009 and succeeded by Operation Restore Order in 2011. Furthermore, a Special Joint Military Task Force (SJMTF) comprising the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Police Force, the Department of State Security, the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Defence Intelligence Agency headed by Major-General John Ewanshia was formed in 2011 (Vanguard News, 2011) aimed at ensuring free flow of information and criminal intelligence sharing so that there would be effective synergy among these security agencies in the fight against Boko Haram.

In a bid to ensure a concrete success in the military operation, a state of emergency was declared in three northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in 2013 (Omenma et al 2020). Constitutionally, emergency power is the coercive power invoked by the president of a state usually backed by the legislature to address grave security concerns which in the reasonable opinion of the government, is practically difficult to be addressed by an ordinary law (Section 305 of 1999 Constitution). This power permits carte blanche for the security forces to arrest and detain the suspect and take control of any facility reasonably suspected to aid insurgents.

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

In practical terms, there was Operation Boyona (BOYONA, an abbreviation of 3 most affected states and Nasarawa – Borno, Yobe, Adamawa) with the operational directive to incapacitate Boko Haram's ability to detonate improvised explosive device (IEDs); it was replaced with Operation Zaman Lafiya (meaning- Live in Peace) with the same obligation. Prior to this, Operation Restore Order 1 was executed and elevated to Operation Restore Order II and III whose target was to reinstate public order in Bauchi and Yobe State. There were also, Operations Lafiya Dole and Deep Punch, aimed at dislodging insurgents from their strongholds (Okeke, 2020). These efforts succeeded in reclaiming some territories, particularly in Borno State, and have resulted in the deaths or capture of several high-ranking Boko Haram commanders.

The latest and ongoing operation is that of Operation Hadinkai, which was launched in 2021 by then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lieutenant General Ibrahim Attahiru having approved the renaming of the Counter-Insurgency Operation in the North East from Operation Lafiya Dole (OPLD) to Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK). This was based on the premise that the Nigerian Army (NA) has made tremendous progress over the years and needs to re-align for better efficiency. Following this re-designation of the operation, the Army Super Camps were created which now reflect the nomenclature of the formations and units followed by the name of the locations they occupy while sub-units are redesigned as Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) followed by the name of their locations (Yerima, 2021).

4.2 Effectiveness of Intelligence-gathering Mechanisms Employed in Counterterrorism in Nigeria's Northeast Corridor

While presenting a checklist of effective administration of intelligence system Saleh (2020), stated that the efficacy of a country's security architecture largely depends on the governance system in operation; influenced by constitutional mandate for defence, security, and intelligence community system, institutions that are organized, skillfully trained, well equipped, and psychologically motivated. However, a situation where the intelligence structure is not coordinated and each intelligence agency work in isolation from the others or at best have an uneasy relationship, the security system appears weak and in the case of the North East, the terrorists would take advantage of such weakness to unleash their devastating terror.

Zen (2019) shared this concern stating that some of the institutional silos, bureaucratic inertia, and interagency mistrust continue to hinder effective collaboration. For instance, the Nigerian military, police, and intelligence agencies often operate independently, with little formalized coordination between their respective intelligence arms. This has led to instances where critical intelligence is delayed or ignored, resulting in missed opportunities to preempt insurgent attacks (Zenn, 2019).

There is indeed a significant relationship between effective intelligence coordination and Nigeria's counterterrorism in the North East. In alignment with above assertions, even though there are flashes of effective intelligence sharing as exemplified by the following: First, rescue of some Chibok school girls who were abducted by Boko Haram in 2014 via satellite and signal intelligence between Nigeria's Department of State Services (DSS), the military, and international partners, including the U.S. and U.K.; secondly, Operation Lafiya Dole which commenced a chain of coordinated intelligence gathering and sharing between the Nigerian military and regional partners in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that led to the successful identification and dismantling of

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

key Boko Haram cells in the Sambisa Forest, disruption of insurgent activities and dismantling of its networks. Other instances of coordinated intelligence between and amongst the security agencies and the community people include:

i. July 4, neutralizing of three terrorists at Platari in Borno State on their way from Sambisa Forest to the Timbuktu Triangle; elimination of another terrorist near Komala following actionable intelligence on insurgent movements in the area; interception of other insurgents transporting logistics leading the killing of two (2) terrorists while others fled with gunshot wounds at Kawuri, Konduga LGA following a night ambush by the troops.

ii. July 5 troops' interception of a group of terrorists killing one (1) of them while attempting to infiltrate the Madarari Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Konduga LGA; and killing of three (3) terrorists.

iii July 6 troops' ambush and elimination of one (1) insurgent along the Ngoshe-Gava, Ngoshe-Ashigashiya, and Amuda-Gava roads.

iv. On July 7, intelligence led troops to Sabsawa village, where two (2) logistics suppliers to Boko Haram insurgents were eliminated.

v. Joint operation on July 8 in Bula Marwa, which resulted in the killing of one (1) terrorist; also Joint fighting patrols in Pambula village, Madagali LGA of Adamawa State, leading to the neutralizing one (1) terrorist; also, a clearance operation at Bula Marwa on July 8, leading to the killing of one (1) insurgent and destruction of their camp.

vi. On July 9, clearance operations carried out in Tangalanga and Bula Marwa, resulted in the killing of three (3) insurgents; same day a coordinated ambush in Ngailda, Manjim, and Wulle villages led to neutralizing six terrorists (Sunday, 2025).

However, such successes were not sustained in most cases, because there were still challenges in interagency communication that often hinder the effectiveness of intelligence sharing (Smith, 2020; Okeke, 2020; Omeni 2017). The fact remains that even though intelligence coordination has led to some successes, such as reduction in the frequency and scale of major Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks, particularly in urban centres, the overall effectiveness of intelligence in neutralizing insurgents in the entire region has been mixed as intelligence failures have often lead to delayed responses to insurgent attacks. For instance, in the case of the 2015 Baga massacre, Boko Haram killed over 2,000 civilians, because delayed intelligence and communication breakdowns between military units prevented a timely response, allowing the insurgents to overrun the town (Zen, 2019).

4.3 Key Challenges Mitigating Effective Actionable Intelligence among the Joint Taskforce (JTF) Engaged in Counterterrorism in the Northeast.

There are a number of key constraints to effective actionable intelligence in the counterterrorist operation in the Northeast. These constraints include:

Operational Constraints: Generally speaking, the counterterrorist JTF operating in the Northeast is confronted with huge operational challenges, ranging from equipment shortages, logistical difficulties, and alleged human rights abuses that undermine public trust, while corruption within

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

security agencies has reportedly diverted resources intended for counter-terrorism operations, weakening response capabilities. These are further elucidated below.

Shortage of Intelligence Officers/Sufficient Training: The shortage of personnel factor is evident of the fact that the entire police force has less than 70 trained modern intelligence analysts while the military has less than 100. The issue of shortage of specialized intelligence personnel poses a significant barrier to actionable intelligence. As insurgent activities intensify in the region, the few available intelligence officers have become increasingly overstretched. This shortage of specialized intelligence personnel has forced the Nigerian agencies to rely on foreign intelligence from international partners such as the United States for the provision of satellite imagery and other resources while limiting Nigeria's self-sufficiency and making it difficult to develop a sustainable, homegrown intelligence infrastructure that can meet the demands of the insurgency (Zenn, 2019).

Besides, many of the available intelligence personnel lack specialized training on counterinsurgency intelligence analysis, data dissemination, and modern surveillance techniques which is more sophisticated than routine intelligence. Intelligence analysis requires a nuanced understanding of insurgent tactics, patterns, and networks, yet many officers receive only rudimentary training. The absence of sufficient training programmes means that intelligence is often poorly processed, leading to inaccurate or delayed decision-making, limiting the capacity for real-time situational awareness (Okeke, 2020).

Poor Intelligence Gathering and Sharing: Lack of coordination among security agencies results in poor intelligence gathering and associated intelligence failures thereby constraining effective counter-terrorism efforts. These stem from inter-agency rivalry and poor information sharing between Nigeria's security agencies involved in the JTF counterterrorism operations in the Northeast. A striking revelation that triggers this is that these security agencies operate with overlapping mandates, which breeds limited collaboration, and create coordination gaps that terrorist groups exploit, resulting to inefficiencies (Egara, Ndubuisi & Uzondu, 2025). Thus, these institutional silos, bureaucratic inertia, and interagency mistrust continue to hinder effective collaboration leading to instances where critical intelligence is delayed or ignored, resulting in missed opportunities to preempt insurgent attacks (Zenn, 2019).

Corroborating the above, Omeni (2017) identified the fact that the major primary barriers to effective intelligence coordination in Nigeria's counter-insurgency operations is the rivalry and lack of trust between the various security agencies, including the military, police, and intelligence services. Each agency tends to operate in silos, often withholding information from others due to internal competition for recognition and funding. This rivalry leads to disjointed operations where critical intelligence is either delayed or not shared at all, hampering the ability of security forces to act on time-sensitive information (Omeni, 2017), worsening inefficiencies, as they prefer protecting their turf rather than collaborating toward a common goal of neutralizing insurgent threats (Smith, 2020).

Poor Access to Human Intelligence in the Northeast Region: There are a number of reasons for this JTF's access to human intelligence in the Northeast. First, the JTF could not take good advantage of the information pool from the civilians for its actionable intelligence, instead, in place of involving the civilians as credible intelligence source, they are rather treated like suspects who they kept at a distance, due mainly to the JTF's past experiences when terrorists who appear to be innocent civilians

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

infiltrate the ranks of the military, concealing and detonating explosives. In the absence of cooperation between the JTF and the civilians, Boko Haram, has made effective use of human intelligence offered by the civilians as agents of intelligence gathering at locations where they plan to attack as well as providing precise information on troop's movement and strategies. Worst of all is the military's involvement in providing arms and ammunition for the sect (Wiener-Bronner, 2014). This mistrust is caused by the following:

Huge Number of Civilian Casualties: The high number of civilian casualties due to terrorism from both the terrorist attacks and military counter attacks who are in many occasions not mindful of the safety of the civilians within the area bred distrust between the military and the Boko Haram (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

Human Rights Abuses: The second cause of distrust between the military and the civilians within the area that is working against counterterrorism involves human rights abuses. This is a situation where punishment is meted on an entire community that is suspected to harbour terrorists; here the community is razed down in flames while members of the community are physically abused by the military. This leaves civilians with no option but to flee from communities that are being approached by soldiers, in other to be saved from the wrought of the military (Ogundipe, 2018).

The implication is that the counterinsurgents are missing the vital intelligence from members of the community and has created a gap in the counterterrorism intelligence in Nigeria's northeast leading to actionable intelligence failure. Thus, majority of locals are hesitant, or unwilling, to provide information to security operatives about the hideouts and activities of the sect members. Consequently, absolute mistrust, suspicion, and fear characterize the relationship between the security operatives and the civilian populations in the volatile states, undermining intelligence undertakings that would lead to the definite identification, arrests and elimination of the sect's members and activities (Amaraegbu, 2013).

Absence of Surveillance and Intelligence Infrastructure in Ungoverned Areas: Terrorist insurgents operate mostly in ungoverned spaces which are rural areas where there are lack of surveillance and intelligence infrastructure (Egara et al., 2025). In remote areas of northeastern Nigeria where Boko Haram and ISWAP are most active, poor communication infrastructure severely limits the ability of security forces to gather, transmit, and act on intelligence. This forces the counterinsurgents to depend heavily on Human Intelligence (HUMINT), from the same operational base of the terrorists that are in most cases sympathetic to the terrorist ideology and poses critical challenge to counterterrorist's actionable intelligence.

For instance, in the case of the 2015 Baga massacre, where Boko Haram killed over 2,000 civilians, delayed intelligence and communication breakdowns between military units prevented a timely response, allowing the insurgents to overrun the town (Fisher, 2015). On a general note, many of the insurgency-prone areas lack reliable telecommunications networks, which hinder real-time intelligence sharing and prevent security forces from coordinating swift responses. The lack of digital communication platforms for seamless intelligence sharing shows that agencies often rely on outdated methods, which are prone to delays and inaccuracies. Thus, Nigeria's intelligence agencies deeply face significant technological deficiencies that limit their ability to conduct real-time surveillance, track insurgent movements, and analyze data. Unlike countries with more advanced counter-

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

insurgency frameworks, Nigeria lack adequate drones, satellite surveillance, and signal interception technologies that are essential for modern intelligence operations (Zenn, 2019; Smith, 2020).

Politicization of the Intelligence Community: Intelligence issues are subjected to manipulation by the Nigerian ruling-elite at various levels of government to allow them to set aside huge sums of money as security votes (Money received to counter terrorism), which is often subject to abuses. This has made recruitments easy for Boko Haram leaders as they capitalize on the political situations (corruption and political instability) of the country (Osumah, 2013).

Inadequate Funding and Corruption: The defence sector suffers from budgetary limitations and alleged misappropriation of funds meant for intelligence equipment and welfare of officers. This has affected troop morale and operational effectiveness of intelligence. Furthermore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) added Nigeria to its "grey list" in 2023 for deficiencies in using intelligence for its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) regime, indicating inadequate resources to track and disrupt terrorist funding networks. This financial constraint limits the capacity of intelligence officers to sustain operations and modernize equipment. Corruption has been linked to lack of equipment for counterterrorism-based actionable intelligence operations.

This explains why Nigeria's counterterrorism operations to defeat Boko Haram has not yielded the expected results, despite allocating approximately 25% of its budget for 2012 to the security sector which should have translated to improved military and intelligence coordination (Amaraegbu, 2013). Misappropriation of funds for counterterrorism by political leaders has resulted in the arrest of several former senior officials on corruption charges (Blanchard, 2016) which included former President Jonathan's National Security Adviser who was charged with fraud over a $2 billion arms deal for equipment that was reportedly never delivered. Also involved were Jonathan's former chief of defence that was accused of stealing $20 million from the air force. Also, over 300 individuals, comprising army officers and companies were placed under investigation for the embezzlement of approximately $240 million in fraudulent or overpaid defence contracts between 2011 and 2015 (Amaraegbu, 2013; Enyia et al.,2022).

Another notable example of corruption amongst the intelligence community, was the discovery of $43 million stashed in an apartment at Osborne Towers, Ikoyi, Lagos by agents of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The claims by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) that the money was approved for covert operations by the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan was not satisfactory on why such colossal amount of cash could be found in a residential building and led to the sack of then Director General of the agency Mr. Oke based on the recommendation of an investigative panel headed by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo (Mutum, 2018). Due to above corruption, intelligence information are sometimes intentionally manipulated or downplayed by vested interests, further complicating coordination efforts. Transparency International (2017) noted that corruption among the top echelons of the military in 2014 led to the withholding of capable weaponry and communication gadgets leaving the frontline troops of the counterterrorism (JTF) who ought to act on intelligence incapacitated thereby endangering their own lives and those of the civilian populace.

Bureaucratic Inefficiency: Nigeria's security architecture is often bogged down by administrative red tape, delaying the flow of information between agencies and decision-makers. This also hampers intelligence coordination, as the slow and bureaucratic process usually prevent timely responses to

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E- ISSN: 3043 – 5463 ISSN: 1595 – 5842 VOLUME 3, ISSUE 2A, 2026

insurgent threats as well as the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast. These call for a new strategic pathway to enhancing actionable intelligence as a sine qua non to effective counterterrorism that can both stem the tide as well as nip terrorism on the bud.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusion

This study established that though are a number of intelligence agencies, however, as they were, they are not fitted into actionable intelligence for effective counterterrorism operations. On the question of effectiveness, it was also found that in spite of noticeable efforts in utilizing intelligence to neutralize scores of terrorist insurgents and rescue of abducted civilians, the actionable intelligence component appears weak as critical intelligence is delayed or ignored resulting in missed opportunities to preempt insurgent attacks. Besides, some of the successes in neutralizing insurgents were not sustained and mixed as intelligence failures often lead to delayed responses to insurgent attacks.

A number of key challenges were identified as mitigating effective actionable intelligence within the counterterrorist Joint Taskforce (JTF) in the Northeast. These include: operational constraints shortage of intelligence officers/sufficient training, poor intelligence gathering and sharing: poor access to human intelligence in the northeast region absence of surveillance and intelligence infrastructure in ungoverned areas, politicization of the intelligence community, inadequate funding and corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, among others.

5.2. Recommendations

Based on the above findings, the following recommendations were made:

i. Strengthening Intelligence Infrastructure for enhanced inter-agency collaboration: This is crucial for counterterrorism operation. On this basis, the NCTC should adopt a more robust command and control structure that would encourage improved and seamless information sharing and communication among security agencies that make up the JTF to boost actionable intelligence.

ii. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Community-based intelligence gathering: This would leverage local knowledge and build trust with civilian populations so that they could collaborate, support the counterinsurgents to identify terrorists, monitor their activities for effective response threat monitoring and response.

iii. Investment in Advanced Technological-based Intelligence Operation: The dynamic nature of threat of terrorism, calls for adoption of advanced technological tools. Thus, priority should be placed on investment in digital surveillance, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and cybersecurity as these tools can significantly improve Nigeria's capacity to monitor and contain terror threats which has adopted sophisticated modus operandi.

iv. Capacity Building and Training: Continuous training for intelligence officers on emerging threats, ethical intelligence gathering, and the use of modern technological tools is crucial. Agencies should also focus on retaining skilled personnel to reduce turnover rates, which can negatively impact intelligence continuity and efficiency.

v. Addressing Socio-Economic and Administrative Root of Corruption: Long-term solutions for addressing corruption, compromise and sabotage by intelligence related administrators and

personnel must involve addressing the socio-economic factors that fuel such behaviours such as poor remuneration, poor welfare package, politicization of recruitments and intelligence issues.

vi. Efforts should be made to recruit sufficient and well-trained intelligence officers for timely and actionable intelligence; by so doing adequate funding should be set aside for intelligence operations and not just concentrating on military hardware.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that no conflict of interest exist in this manuscript.

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