



RESEARCH ARTICLE

SILENCING THE GUN BY 2030: THE ROLE OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE AFRICAN UNION'S PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

DARE ISAAC AKINDOYIN

Department of Political Science & International Relations, Augustine University,
Ilara-Epe, Lagos, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The African Union's (AU) flagship initiative, Silencing the Guns by 2030, aims to end violent conflict on the continent and usher in an era of sustainable peace and development. As part of the AU's broader Peace and Security Agenda, preventive diplomacy is recognized as a critical tool for addressing the root causes of conflict before they escalate into full-scale violence. However, persistent armed conflicts, political instability, and governance challenges raise important questions about the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy in achieving this ambitious goal. This paper explores the role of preventive diplomacy in the implementation of the Silencing the Guns initiative, focusing on its potential, limitations, and strategic relevance. The central objective is to assess how preventive diplomacy can be better leveraged to advance peace and security in Africa. The study employs a qualitative methodology, relying on secondary data from official AU documents, scholarly publications, and policy reports. The Liberal Institutionalism theory guides the analysis, emphasizing the importance of international institutions, cooperation, and dialogue in managing conflicts. Key findings reveal that although preventive diplomacy mechanisms such as early warning systems, diplomatic mediation, and political dialogue exist within the AU framework, their effectiveness is often constrained by insufficient political will, resource gaps, institutional weaknesses, and external interference. Nonetheless, the research highlights that with improved coordination, stronger institutional capacity, and genuine commitment from member states, preventive diplomacy holds significant promise in contributing to conflict prevention. The study concludes that preventive diplomacy remains indispensable to achieving the Silencing the Guns by 2030 vision. It recommends strengthening institutional frameworks, enhancing AU-led mediation capacity, ensuring sustained political will, and fostering inclusive dialogue to prevent conflict and secure long-term peace across the continent.

Keywords: Silencing, gun, preventive, diplomacy, peace, security.

Corresponding Author

Dare Isaac AKINDOYIN

Email Address: dare.akindoyin@augustineuniversity.edu.ng Telephone Number: +2348128366161

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0000-7993-0304>

Received: 25/1/2026; **Revised:** 27/2/2026; **Accepted:** 22/3/2026; **Published:** 28/3/2026



1.0. INTRODUCTION

Africa still has to deal with ongoing and changing security threats, such as armed conflicts within states, unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism, ethnic violence, and conflicts over resources. Africa is still one of the most conflict-prone areas in the world, even though there are many regional and continental systems in place to deal with these problems. In recognition of the pressing need to end violent conflicts and build sustainable peace, the African Union (AU) launched the flagship initiative “Silencing the Guns by 2030” as part of its Agenda 2063, with the central aim of achieving a conflict-free Africa through enhanced conflict prevention, management, and resolution frameworks (Akinola & Matlosa, 2025).

Preventive diplomacy, which means doing things to stop disagreements from turning into wars and to keep wars from spreading, is a key part of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It includes things like mediation, early warning systems, building trust, and quiet diplomacy. The AU has made preventive diplomacy a permanent part of its work by setting up groups like the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and working with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Even though these systems are officially in place, there are still questions about how well they work in practice, especially as the 2030 deadline for "Silencing the Guns" approaches (Okumu, 2020).

The AU's tendency to react to conflicts instead of taking action to stop them makes the situation worse. For example, the AU's ability to act quickly and effectively with preventive tools has been shown to be very lacking in countries like Cameroon (the Anglophone conflict), Mozambique (the Cabo Delgado insurgency), and Sudan (the violence that followed the coup) (Ani, & Ojatorotu, 2021). The return of coups in West Africa from 2021 to 2023 also makes the AU's normative frameworks less credible. This makes it less likely that the AU can achieve the "Silencing the Guns" vision through preventive diplomacy alone (Akindoyin, 2024).

So, even though preventive diplomacy is still an important part of the AU's peace and security agenda, it hasn't been used enough or consistently. This lack of consistency makes it harder to reach a lasting peace and is a major threat to the success of "Silencing the Guns." This study aims to critically look at the role of preventive diplomacy in the African Union's peace and security agenda, with a focus on how it helps or hurts the larger goal of stopping the fighting by 2030.

This study has three goals: first, to define preventive diplomacy and how it fits into the AU framework; second, to look at how preventive diplomacy has been used in some African conflict cases; and third, to look at the problems and possibilities of using preventive diplomacy to reach the 2030 goal. Some of the guiding questions are: How has the AU put preventive diplomacy into action in APSA? What successes or failures have come up in its use? And what changes need to be made to make it work better?

This study is important for both the academic and policy makers. From an academic point of view, it adds to the body of work on conflict prevention and diplomacy in Africa, especially in regional organizations. From a policy point of view, it gives a timely critique of the AU's current path and suggests useful ways to rethink preventive diplomacy. With less than five years until the 2030 deadline, the AU's peace and security agenda needs to be looked at again right away to make sure it



stays relevant and focused on getting results (Nagar, 2022). The study uses a qualitative method, which means it looks at case studies and documents. It uses reports, communiqués, academic papers, and policy papers from the AU, its Peace and Security Council, and other groups that work with the AU.

2.0. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Conceptual Framework

Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy denotes what state do to stop contentions from turning into wars and to stop violence from spreading when it does happen. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali made the idea popular by calling for early, non-coercive diplomatic actions to deal with the root causes of conflict (Adebajo, 2021). The African Union (AU) has made preventive diplomacy a key part of its peace and security system in Africa. It includes a lot of different tools, such as early warning, fact-finding missions, shuttle diplomacy, quiet diplomacy, mediation, and measures to build trust (Mahlangu, 2025).

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a set of institutions that show the AU's commitment to preventive diplomacy. It includes the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the African Standby Force (ASF). These groups are in charge of finding and dealing with early signs of possible conflicts all over the continent. But in practice, the AU's willingness or ability to intervene early is often affected by political factors (Akindoyin, 2025a).

Silencing the Guns by 2030

"Silencing the Guns by 2030" is one of the main goals of the African Union's Agenda 2063. The goal is to make Africa free of wars, civil wars, gender-based violence, human rights abuses, and humanitarian disasters. The initiative started in 2013 and was strengthened during the AU's 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. It shows a bold vision for lasting peace and development that includes everyone on the continent. The initiative says that we need to deal with the root causes of conflict, like bad government, marginalization, poverty, and youth unemployment (Citaristi, 2021). Even though the goal is good, the continent has seen a rise in unconstitutional changes of government, cross-border terrorism, and internal armed conflicts, which makes it hard to believe that the deadline of 2030 can be met (Akindoyin, 2024b).

2.2. Theoretical Framework

This study is based on the idea of Liberal Institutionalism, which is a theory of international relations that focuses on how international organizations and institutions can help people work together and avoid conflict. According to liberal institutionalists, states can get around the chaotic nature of the international system by making rules, norms, and procedures that make things less uncertain, more open, and easier to settle disputes peacefully (Adelman, 2023). This theory is especially useful for looking at the African Union's role as a regional body that helps keep the peace and settle disputes on the continent.



When it comes to preventive diplomacy, liberal institutionalism helps us understand how regional organizations like the AU can help people talk to each other, keep an eye out for early warning signs, and start working together to stop conflicts. The establishment of the AU's Peace and Security Council and other mechanisms under APSA reflects an institutionalist belief in the power of collective security frameworks to manage peace (Khadiagala, 2023). Critics of the AU's institutional capacity, on the other hand, say that even though structures are in place on paper, they can't be used in practice because of problems like state sovereignty, lack of funding, and weak political will among member states.

Liberal institutionalism also stresses how important norms and shared values are in determining how states act. Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act says that the AU is committed to not being indifferent. This is different from the OAU's strict non-interference principle and is more in line with institutionalist thinking, which says that people should work together to deal with serious threats to peace and security. However, this theory needs to be backed up by a critical look at constructivist ideas, which stress how ideas, identities, and discourse affect how diplomats act. The AU's repeated emphasis on "African solutions to African problems" shows that it has a regional identity that affects how it tries to stop conflicts and build peace (Yuksel, 2023). Constructivism helps us understand why the AU might put some crises ahead of others based on historical, political, or ideological reasons. When combined, liberal institutionalism and constructivism give us a strong way to look at how preventive diplomacy can help "Silencing the Guns" reach its goals. The institutionalist view focuses on the importance of rules and mechanisms, while the constructivist view focuses on the AU's internal dynamics, the interests of its member states, and the regional stories that shape its actions.

3.0. METHODOLOGY

The study employs a qualitative research, relying on secondary data from official AU documents, scholarly publications, and policy reports. The qualitative approach facilitates a contextual and an in-depth comprehension of the discourse. Similarly, content analysis is utilised to analyse the aforementioned secondary materials while concentrating on principal themes of the discourse.

4.0. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Overview of Preventive Diplomacy within the African Union

The development of preventive diplomacy in Africa is closely tied to the continent's efforts to keep the peace, manage conflicts, and keep the region stable. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was founded in 1963, initially had a strict policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of its member states. This made it harder for the OAU to stop or mediate conflicts. The OAU did a lot to help liberation movements and fight apartheid, but it mostly didn't do anything to stop internal conflicts like the Rwandan genocide and civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Magu, 2021).

The African Union (AU) was formed in 2002, which changed how the continent dealt with conflict prevention and diplomacy. Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act says that the organization changed its stance from non-interference to non-indifference. This was a change from the OAU. This article gives the AU the power to step in when there are war crimes, genocide, or crimes against



humanity in member states. This shows a strong commitment to protecting human security and preventing war (Magu, 2021). The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) have made preventive diplomacy a permanent part of the AU. There are a few important parts of the architecture that help with early warning and preventive engagement:

The Peace and Security Council (PSC): This is the main group that makes decisions about how to prevent, manage, and solve conflicts. The PSC regularly briefs members on new crises and can give the go-ahead for diplomatic missions and interventions.

The Wise Panel (PoW): This group is made up of respected African politicians and carries out diplomatic tasks like fact-finding missions, shuttle diplomacy, and quiet backchannel talks in places where there might be conflict.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): This is meant to gather and analyze information to stop violent conflicts from breaking out on the continent.

The African Standby Force (ASF): The ASF is more useful for coercive responses, but it can also be used for quick deployment for preventive diplomacy missions, especially in places that are about to go to war or are still recovering from one (Magu, 2021).

Even though these institutions exist, preventive diplomacy has not been used consistently or in a selective way. The AU has recorded both successes and failures. For instance, during Kenya's 2007–2008 post-election crisis; the AU worked well with regional actors to help the two warring political groups come to a power-sharing agreement. In the same way, the AU used coordinated diplomatic pressure through ECOWAS to help President Yahya Jammeh leave peacefully in The Gambia (2016–2017). He refused to accept defeat in the elections (Jamiu, 2021).

However, the AU has not been as good at dealing with other conflicts. For example, the AU's late involvement in the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon and the fact that early warnings didn't have much of an effect on the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, showed that there were problems with coordination, political will, and member state sovereignty sensitivities (Jamiu, 2021). The AU often has to make a tough choice between respecting sovereignty and acting quickly to stop mass atrocities. Also, the financial and operational limits of APSA organs have made it hard to do quick and long-term preventive diplomacy.

The AU and the UN have also worked together in new ways over time, especially on joint preventive diplomacy missions. The AU-UN Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security (2017) encourages working together on early warning, mediation, and preventive deployment, but there are still problems with coordination and duplication.

4.2. Case Studies of Preventive Diplomacy in Practice

South Sudan (2013–2018): Delayed Engagement and Reactive Mediation

The war in South Sudan started in December 2013 when President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar had a political disagreement. It quickly turned into ethnic violence. The AU knew ahead of time that politics were unstable, but its preventive diplomacy response was slow. The



Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led the first round of mediation, and the AU helped the peace process from behind the scenes. In 2014, the AU set up the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan, along with the Peace and Security Council's (PSC) involvement. But the AU's role was mostly to support rather than take the lead. The AU-supported peace deal that IGAD helped make in 2015 fell apart within a year, and fighting broke out again (Wondemagegnehu, 2021). The AU's failure to take strong action early in the conflict shows that there are gaps in the system that connect early warning to early action, and that the AU often relies on regional economic communities even when they are not very good at working together.

Burundi (2015): Preventive Diplomacy Blocked by Sovereignty Concerns

Burundi had a political crisis in 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza said he wanted to run for a third term, which many people thought was against the law. The move led to huge protests, an unsuccessful coup attempt, and a lot of political unrest. The AU acted quickly by making strong statements and sending human rights observers and military experts. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) also suggested sending a 5,000-member African Prevention and Protection Mission to Burundi (MAPROBU) to stop violence from spreading.

The Burundian government, on the other hand, turned down the proposed intervention because it would have violated its sovereignty. Even though Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act gave the AU the legal power to do so, the member states did not have the political will to go through with the intervention without Burundi's permission (Nyane, 2023). This case shows how hard it is to use preventive diplomacy when AU member states have strong ideas about sovereignty and not getting involved.

The AU, on the other hand, kept up diplomatic efforts, such as mediation led by the East African Community (EAC) and the ongoing deployment of observers. The AU's failure to carry out MAPROBU showed that it was weak at enforcing preventive mandates without agreement, even though violence did not turn into full-scale war (Sylistier, 2022).

Cameroon (2016–Present): Silence in the Face of Escalating Crisis

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon started in 2016 as peaceful protests by English-speaking teachers and lawyers. Since then, it has turned into an armed separatist conflict. The AU has not done much to help, even though there are clear signs that things are getting worse and human rights are being violated. The crisis has caused thousands of deaths and forced many people to leave their homes, but the AU has not taken any major diplomatic steps. The AU has not sent any high-level mediators or diplomats to Cameroon, unlike in South Sudan and Burundi. Analysts say this is because Cameroon has a lot of political and diplomatic power, the AU doesn't agree on what to do, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is too dependent on Cameroon (Tschunkert, 2025).

This case shows that the AU only gets involved when it is politically sensitive or when it has to do with regional geopolitics. The AU's lack of action in Cameroon shows that it is not always true to its promise to not be indifferent, which hurts its credibility. These three case studies show that the AU's use of preventive diplomacy has had mixed results. The AU has made progress in putting in place



early warning and preventive systems, but they are still not used consistently, are limited by politics, and are often reactive instead of proactive. Member state resistance, limited capacity, and too much reliance on regional bodies are still problems that make it hard to prevent conflicts.

4.3. Challenges and Prospects of Preventive Diplomacy in Achieving “Silencing the Guns”

Under its Agenda 2063 framework, the African Union's goal of "Silence the Guns by 2030" is still one of its most ambitious and visionary goals. The main goal of this vision is to use preventive diplomacy effectively to deal with new threats before they turn into violent conflicts. But making this goal a reality has been hard because of a number of problems that are all connected to each other, even though some good things keep happening. One of the biggest problems with preventive diplomacy is that member states don't want to do it. Even though the AU has changed its mind about the principle of non-interference in favor of non-indifference, many governments still use sovereignty as an excuse to keep outsiders from looking at what they do.

The political crisis in Burundi in 2015, when President Nkurunziza tried to get a third term, is a good example of how people don't want to accept preventive measures. The African Union (AU) suggested sending a peacekeeping force of 5,000 troops to Burundi as part of the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), but the Burundian government flatly turned down the idea. The AU backed down when faced with opposition instead of using Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which allows intervention in cases of serious human rights violations. This showed the limits of entrenched sovereignty norms (Afewerky, 2023).

The AU's reliance on outside donors for money is another big problem. Consistent and flexible funding is needed for preventive diplomacy, especially for early warning and quick response efforts. But most of the money for the AU's peace and security work comes from partners like the EU and the UN. This means that diplomatic action is often delayed or watered down because of funding problems. For instance, people have said that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) can't turn alerts into quick action because it doesn't have enough staff or resources, especially in weak states like the Central African Republic and parts of the Sahel (Dube & Kamau, 2023).

Also, the relationship between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is still not very clear, which leads to overlapping mandates and responses that are not well coordinated. For example, look at South Sudan. Both the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tried to mediate when violence broke out in 2013. However, the two groups did not work together very well, which led to two separate processes that slowed down real progress toward peace. This fragmentation makes things harder for the people who are fighting and makes Africa-led solutions less credible (Mei, 2025).

The AU's selective involvement in conflicts across the continent has not been impressive. The AU was very active during the Gambia's 2016–2017 election crisis, working with ECOWAS to get Yahya Jammeh to admit defeat. However, it has been very quiet about the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. The AU hasn't taken any major diplomatic action, even though there are clear signs of state repression, rising violence, and people being forced to leave their homes. Some experts say that political interests and internal lobbying often decide which crises get the AU's attention, which hurts its moral authority and consistency (Aagaard, 2024).



Also, preventive diplomacy in Africa is still very state-centered and civil society, youth, and women are often left out of peace talks. This has caused a lack of legitimacy at the grassroots level and missed chances to get involved early on. In places like Sudan and Mali, where youth-led protests and civic activism were early signs of government failure, the AU didn't include these voices in its diplomatic plans. Because of this, peace efforts became driven by elites and didn't include everyone, which is necessary for long-lasting results (Aagaard, 2024).

Even though these problems exist, some new things give us hope for better preventive diplomacy. Some recent steps to make the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) stronger are bringing back the Panel of the Wise and adding more groups, such as FemWise-Africa and the Network of African Youth in Conflict Prevention. These projects are meant to make diplomacy more inclusive by including more than just formal state actors. This will make it more legitimate and effective. In the same way, new technologies are being used to make early warning systems better. The AU is adding social media analysis, satellite data, and local reporting to CEWS. This makes it better at finding and responding to threats in unstable areas like the Sahel and Horn of Africa (Aagaard, 2024).

The AU's relationship with the UN is also getting stronger. The AU-UN Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which was signed in 2017, has made it easier for the two organizations to work together on preventive diplomacy. For example, they worked together to deal with the Cabo Delgado insurgency in Mozambique. Also, a stronger focus on getting young people and women involved in peacebuilding, through organizations like FemWise-Africa, points to a hopeful move toward more open and inclusive diplomacy. For example, youth networks in Nigeria and the DRC have helped lower tensions during elections by giving people early warning and teaching them about their rights (Arulogun, 2023).

5.0. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"Silencing the Guns by 2030" is an important step toward peace, stability, and long-term growth in Africa. The initiative is part of the larger Agenda 2063 framework and shows the African Union's commitment to dealing with the causes of conflict and making sure that no African generation grows up in war and displacement. This study looked at the important role that preventive diplomacy plays in reaching this goal, focusing on both its historical roots and how it is used today in the African Union.

The AU uses preventive diplomacy to stop conflicts before they start by finding, keeping an eye on, and dealing with early signs of political instability before they turn into full-blown crises. Some of the things that help this happen are mediation, early warning systems, and the change in norms from non-interference to non-indifference. However, putting these tools into action has been very difficult because member states have been politically opposed, institutions have limited capacity, they depend on outside donors for money, and the AU and sub-regional organizations have had trouble working together.

The liberal institutionalist theory was used to frame the analysis in this study. Liberal institutionalism says that when international organizations and regimes are given the right powers and set up in the right way, they can help keep the international system from falling into chaos and encourage cooperation between states. From this point of view, the African Union and its related peace and



security structures are important ways for institutions to help people talk to each other, build trust, and deal with tensions between states and within states. But the AU can only do this job if its member states are willing to follow the rules, respect the mandates of institutions, and take responsibility for peace and security as a group.

The real-life examples looked at, which range from The Gambia to South Sudan and Cameroon, show that preventive diplomacy doesn't always work well in Africa. There have been some big successes, but they are still isolated and often rely on strong partnerships in the region, like the AU-ECOWAS partnership in West Africa. On the other hand, not taking decisive action in other areas shows how weak AU mechanisms are when they don't have the support of a unified political will. Also, the AU's heavy reliance on outside funding and technical help makes people worry about ownership, sustainability, and the ability to act quickly and independently.

Even though there are problems, there are ways to make preventive diplomacy stronger. New ways to act include making inclusive dialogue a part of institutions by involving women and young people, using technology more in early warning systems, and building stronger partnerships with the UN and civil society groups. The growth of groups like FemWise-Africa and the Youth4Peace initiative within the AU framework shows that diplomacy is changing to be more inclusive and representative.

There are a number of important suggestions for moving forward. First, it is very important to give the AU more power by helping member states get more resources from within their own borders. The AU will be able to act quickly and decisively to stop conflicts if it has more financial independence and isn't limited by donor-imposed rules. Second, the AU needs to improve how well its different parts work together, especially between its Peace and Security Council and the Regional Economic Communities. Clearly defining roles and setting up joint action protocols will cut down on overlap and make sure that intervention strategies are always the same.

Similarly, the AU should put money into building up its institutions, especially its early warning and mediation departments. This means giving rapid response teams better staffing, training, and logistical support. Fourth, it is important for everyone in society to support preventive diplomacy. The AU needs to make sure that young people and women are involved in conflict prevention strategies, not just as beneficiaries but also as active agents of peace. Lastly, leaders in politics all over the continent need to make peace a top priority for development. Heads of state and government need to understand that preventive diplomacy is not a sign of weakness or outside interference; it is a shared duty based on African solidarity and collective security.

In conclusion, the goal of stopping the guns by 2030 is still possible, but only if preventive diplomacy goes from being talk to being done every day. The African Union can be a better tool for peace on the continent if it puts liberal institutionalist ideas like cooperation, institutional commitment, and shared values into action. The next five years will be very important, and we need to take bold action instead of just saying things. Africa is responsible for stopping the guns; they won't stop on their own.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that no conflict of interest exist in this manuscript.

**REFERENCES**

- Aagaard, P., Easton, M., & Head, B. W. (2024). Policy expertise in times of crisis. *Policy & Politics*, 52(1), 2–23.
- Adebajo, A. (2021). Boutros Boutros-Ghali: The Afro-Arab peacemaker. In *The Pan-African Pantheon* (pp. 195–206). Manchester University Press.
- Adelman, J., Chaudoin, S., Colbourn, S., Conway, M., Goldgeier, J., Immerman, R. H., ... & Maier, C. S. (2023). *Chaos reconsidered: The liberal order and the future of international politics*. Columbia University Press.
- Afewerky, R. K. (2023). Residual responsibility to implement: The AU, the Constitutive Act, and the responsibility to protect. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 16(2), 127–149.
- Akindoyin, D. I., & Obafemi, A. O. (2024). Regional power dynamics and security approaches: A comparative study of SADC and ECOWAS. *African Journal of Stability and Development (AJSD)*, 16(2), 245–263.
- Akindoyin, D. I., & Obafemi, A. O. (2025a). Evaluating the impact of insecurity on Nigeria's national development since the Fourth Republic. *African Journal of Stability and Development (AJSD)*, 17(1), 91–107.
- Akindoyin, D. I. (2024b). International relations in the 21st century: The role of track-two diplomacy in conflict resolution. *Perspective Politice*, 17(1–2), 5–18.
- Akinola, A. O., & Matlosa, K. (2025). African Union and the Agenda 2063 project. In *African Union and Agenda 2063: The Past, Present and Future* (p. 3).
- Ani, K. J., & Ojatorotu, V. (2021). African Union and conflict management in Africa: An analysis. *Journal of African Union Studies*, 10(1), 71.
- Arulogun, C. F. (2023). Early warning system of conflict prevention strategy in Nigeria. *International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation*, 10(05), 163–185.
- Citaristi, I. (2022). African Union—AU. In *The Europa Directory of International Organizations 2022* (pp. 423–437). Routledge.
- Frimpong, R. A. (2023). The future of United Nations-African Union (UN-AU) cooperation on peace and security: Lessons learnt from the AU-UN Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In *Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations* (pp. 131–149). Springer International Publishing.
- Jamiu, M. S. (2021). *ECOWAS and conflict management in West Africa: A study of the Gambian transition of power between Presidents Yahya Jammeh and Adama Barrow* (Master's thesis, Kwara State University, Nigeria).



- Khadiagala, G. (2023). The African Union peace and security architecture (APSA) in the search for peace and security: The record over the past twenty years. *Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und Vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung*, 33(1).
- Magu, S. M. (2021). Africa's post-colonial foreign policy: Assessing history, imagining the future. In *Explaining Foreign Policy in Post-Colonial Africa* (pp. 299–337). Springer International Publishing.
- Mahlangu, J. (2025). The effectiveness of the African Union in promoting regional stability. *Authorea Preprints*.
- Mei, Y. (2025). Misaligned interests and the credibility of alleged support. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 37(3), 232–257.
- Nagar, D. (2022). *Challenging the United Nations peace and security agenda in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- 'Nyane, H. (2023). An analysis of the African Union's Constitutive Act. *Journal of African Union Studies*, 12(2), 5–24.
- Okumu, W., Atta-Asamoah, A., & Sharamo, R. D. (2020). Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020: Achievements, opportunities and challenges. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, 2020(203), 1–60.
- Sylister, M. (2022). The African Union use of force to uphold democracy and constitutionalism in practice: How far have we gone? *RiA Recht in Afrika | Law in Africa | Droit en Afrique*, 25(1), 84–134.
- Tschunkert, K. (2025). Effectiveness of the African Union in conflict response.
- Wondemagegnehu, D. Y. (2021). Peace and security. *Yearbook on the African Union*, 148.
- Yuksel, A. (2023). African solutions to African problems: An assessment of the African Union (AU)'s policy implementation for peace and security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 2004.